Tech Business

Companies Are Spending Billions On AI – And Getting Almost Nothing Back

I will start by discussing an earlier period of major technological advances and what lessons we might distill from it for the current juncture. Next, I will turn to what evidence we have regarding the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI).2 I will consider how widely these tools are being used, in which sectors, and what recent research tells us about their potential effects on productivity. Then, I will consider the implications of rapid technological change for the economy more broadly, including for aggregate supply and demand, for inflation, and for the labor market. Finally, I will discuss briefly my thinking about the economic outlook and monetary policy. Productivity Puzzles: Then and Now Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Solow famously wrote in 1987 that “you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”3 He may have been expecting too much from the computers he saw. 

While 32 percent of workers used computers at work in 1989, the computers were not very powerful. To illustrate, the processor in your phone today can do about as many calculations per second as 10 million 1987 vintage personal computers (PCs).4 In the aggregate, national spending on computers—shown in figure 1— was barely detectable at the time, despite PCs being an important part of the zeitgeist.5 Ten years later, computer investment had taken off and some observers, notably Chairman Greenspan, believed they could see it in the productivity statistics, though the link between the two was only established later.6 Investment in information technology (IT) capital— computers, software, and communications equipment—increased the annual growth rate of labor productivity about 3/4 percentage point in the late 1990s. 

While that expansion of the IT capital stock directly boosted worker productivity, there was more than that to the IT boom. Businesses also reorganized their operations around computers, which further supported productivity growth. Advancements in technology changed the cost of creating, storing, and communicating information and provided an opportunity for firms to rethink their scope, scale, and production functions.8 E-commerce, a wave of globalization, and software in the cloud eventually emerged from that process. One sign that reorganization was beneficial and significant was the rapid rise in the amount of output per unit of input outside the IT sector in the early 2000s. That productivity growth was not purely due to investing in more capital; instead, it also reflected increases in what economists call total factor productivity, or TFP. 

The seeds of the 1990s productivity boom were planted long before Solow’s observations in 1987. Basic research that laid the foundations for modern computing included the invention of the transistor in 1947 and the Fortran compiler in 1954. For decades, the applied research by firms that followed yielded practical applications for these advances, relentlessly improving information technology. This pattern suggests a simple model of productivity growth. Basic research, conducted without a definite application in mind, expands our knowledge about the world. Applied research develops practical industrial applications, which increase productivity and drive down the cost of production. When costs decrease in those industries, prices tend to fall as well, especially in the presence of competition. 

Over time, firms intensify their use of lower-priced capital goods produced by higher productivity, a process known as “capital deepening.” Finally, firms using that capital rethink their approach to production, further increasing TFP and, perhaps, starting the investment cycle again. As the computing example illustrates, this process takes time for its full effect to be felt and measured, particularly for technologies that require business reorganization It may be reasonable to apply this model to the development of AI. The generative models in focus today can be traced back to basic research that began soon after the transistor was invented.10 Practical applications emerged many years later. 

For example, the U.S. Postal Service began using AI to read hand-addressed envelopes in the 1990s.11 Usage took off, especially in the information and finance sectors, about 10 years later with the emergence of machine-learning models. Finally, after incredible improvements and training on massive data sets—all the text on the worldwide web, by some accounts— large language models are now good enough to support today’s popular chatbots, coding assistants, and smart devices as well as a host of less visible applications like scientific research. Today’s world mirrors the one Bob Solow observed. The new technology seems to be everywhere: Generative AI dominates the news headlines, sits on our phones, and pops up in our software and customer service calls. 

It may have far-reaching implications for workers, firms, and government agencies, including central banks. But the old questions continue to haunt: How much are businesses and workers actually using it, and is that use affecting the productivity statistics? Now, I’ll review some preliminary evidence on these questions. Paths of Adoption Recent surveys find that an appreciable and rising share of U.S. firms and workers are using generative AI. Surveys of workers have found that 40 to 50 percent of working adults are using the technology in their jobs, as shown by the blue line in figure 2.12 Among those workers who do use AI at work, however, only a modest fraction uses it every day, as the red dashed line shows. 

Culled from https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 

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